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Synthesizing Related Rules from
Statutes and Cases for
Legal Expert Systems
LAYMAN E. ALLEN, SALLYANNE PAYTON
and CHARLES S. SAXON

Abstract. Different legal expert systems may be incompatible with each other: A user
in characterizing the same situation by answering the questions presented in a consultation can be led to contradictory inferences. Such systems can be ”synthesized’ to help
users avoid such contradictions by alerting them that other relevant systems are available
to be consulted as they are responding to questions. An example of potentially incompatible, related legal expert systems is presented here - ones for the New Jersey murder
statute and the celebrated Quinlan case, along with one way of synthesizing them to
avoid such incompatibility.

I. Introduction
A crucial step in both the initial building of, as well as the updating of rulebased legal expert systems, is determining which legal rules are to be embodied
in the system. This process of determining the rules to be embodied involves
two distinct substeps: (1)deciding whether a candidate legal rule is actually a
legal rule in the jurisdiction to which the expert system applies, and (2) selecting
from the actual legal rules in that jurisdiction, the ones that are to be embodied
in the expert system. The rules selected will determine the scope and completeness
of the system. The existence in the federal system of the United States of multiple
state systems, coupled with a national legal system makes deciding which legal
rules are applicable in a given jurisdiction both complicated and uncertain. To
the extent that the grand metaphor of the legal system as a “seamless web”
mirrors legal reality, such selection is inevitably arbitrary and results in an expert
system that is incomplete - but such selection is a necessary concession for
building practical expert systems for specific parts of the total legal system.
Some of the problems of designing and updating a legal expert system (hereafter,

Synthesizing Related Rules for Legal Expert Systems

273

”LES”) are exemplified in this article by a small LES that deals with criminal
homicide in the State of New Jersey. Rules from the New Jersey Code of Criminal
Justice are embodied in this LES. A second LES is built from the rules set forth
in the order for declaratory relief in the opinion of the New Jersey Supreme
Court in In the Mutter of Karen Quinlun, an Alleged Incompetent 70 N.J. 10,
355 A.2d 647,79 ALR 3d 205 (1976).
The opinion of the New Jersey Supreme Court in the Quinlun case drew upon
some additional rules articulated by the United States Supreme Court in interpreting the United States Constitution which bear on how the Quinlun rules
are to be appropriately integrated or synthesized with the other New Jersey legal
rules. The need for such synthesis is dramatically illustrated by the contradictory
inferences that are drawn when a given hypothetical situation is analyzed by
each LES separately. Clearly, some means of resolving this incompatibility is
needed. One alternative is an integration of the rules that comprise the two
systems to form a combined LES. Another alternative, and the one pursued
in greater detail in this paper, is to synthesize related expert systems by providing
assistance to coordinate their use to help users avoid the potential incompatibilities. The discussion that follows is motivated by the need to develop
a procedure for synthesizing related rules for legal expert systems.
11. Expert System of the New Jersey Rules of Criminal Homicide

Title 2C, Chapter 11 of the New Jersey Revised Statutes deals with criminal
homicide. The first five sections of Chapter 11define four forms of criminal
homicide: murder, aggravated manslaughter, manslaughter, and death by auto.
The sixth section defines another crime, aiding suicide, which is not a criminal
homicide. A legal expert system called NJ2C-11 has been constructed from these
six sections of Chapter 11.’The Present Version of the parts of these six
sections that are embodied in NJ2C-11 are set forth in Appendix A.
These six sections have been transformed into Clear Normalized Form, which
is also set forth in Appendix A. This normalized interpretation of Chapter 11
of the New Jersey Code of Criminal Justice is automatically generated when
an appropriate input file is used with the NORMALIZER software (Allen and
Saxon 1985). When this same input file is used with the AUTOPRO software
(Allen and Saxon 1988a, 1988b, 1988c, 1988d, Allen and Stipanovic 1988) the
Prolog code for the NJ2C-11 LES is automatically generated. NORMALIZER
also generates another normalized representation of Chapter 11called the Clear
Mnemonic Arrow Diagram. Both of these normalized versions express the rules
embodied in the LES in a manner that enables the lawyer expert to easily check
that they correspond with his or her expert opinion about how the provisions
It should be noted, however, that NJ2C-11 does not include the provisions expressed in subsections 2C-ll-3(b-g) that deal with sentencing of those convicted of murder. NJ2C-11 also omits
section 2C-11-2.1, dealing with Elapse of time between assault and death, prosecution for criminal

homicide.
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of the New Jersey Code of Criminal Justice are to be interpreted. The input
file for the two computer programs and the Clear Mnemonic Arrow Diagram
of the interpretation of Chapter 11 are also included in Appendix A.'
Section 11-3 of the New Jersey Code of Criminal Justice provides, among
other things, (1)that a person knowingly causing the death of another human
being is guilty of criminal homicide, and (2) that if the criminal homicide is
not done in the heat of passion resulting from a reasonable provocation, it
constitutes murder. Consider how the following hypothetical situation would
be analyzed by using the NJ2C-11 LES or the normalized versions of the interpretation of Chapter 11 that has been embodied in NJ2C-11.
A father sought and was appointed guardian of the person and property of
his 21-year old daughter who was in a persistent vegetative state. He also sought
and obtained from the court the express power of authorizing the discontinuance
of all extraordinary procedures for sustaining the daughter's vital processes,
which were then being sustained by a mechanical respirator. The court order
included permission to have the respirator disconnected. The daughter's
attending physicians had advised the father and the rest of the family that there
was no chance that the daughter would ever emerge from her comatose state
and had recommended that the mechanical respirator be disconnected. After
obtaining authority from the court to discontinue extraordinary procedures,
the father along with the rest of the family (1)concurred with the physicians'
judgment that the daughter would never recover and that the respirator should
be disconnected, and (2) authorized the attending physicians to consult with
the hospital Ethics Committee about disconnecting it. After the Ethics Committee
agreed with the physicians' prognosis, the physicians disconnected the respirator,
and the daughter died within an hour.
When the facts of this case were brought to the attention of the prosecutor,
she consulted the NJ2C-11 LES on criminal homicide about the case and was
advised that the physicians were guilty of the criminal homicide of murder under
2C-11-3 of the New Jersey Code of Criminal Justice. The record of her consultation with NJ2C-11 is included in Appendix A.
111. Background to In re Quidan

In re Quinlan (Quinlan case 1976)owes its prominence to the fact that it changed
the nature of legal analysis of situations involving the termination of treatment
on permanently unconscious or terminally ill patients. Prior to Quinlan the
termination of treatment on a patient under circumstances where that patient
was likely to die without the assistance of the treatment so terminated would
have been characterized by well-socialized lawyers and judges as homicide in
Copies of the NORMALIZER software and of the AUTOPRO software are available to those
researchers and practicing lawyers who wish to explore the use of it. Requests should be addressed
to: Layman E. Allen, Law School, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI 48109-1215.
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every state.3 The New Jersey homicide statute in force in 1975 was typical of
the state of the law; it provided:
2A:113-1. Murder

If any person, in committing or attempting to commit arson, burglary, kidnapping, rape,
robbery, sodomy or any unlawful act against the peace of this state, of which the probable
consequences may be bloodshed, kills another, or if the death of any one ensues from
the committing or attempting to commit any such crime or act: or if any person kills
a judge, magistrate, sheriff, coroner, constable or other officer or justice, either civil
or criminal, of this state, or a marshal or other officer of justice, either civil or criminal,
of the United States, in the execution of his office or duty, or kills any of his assistants,
whether specially called to his aid or not, endeavoring to preserve the peace or apprehend
a criminal, knowing the authority of such assistant, or kills a private person endeavoring
to suppress an affray, or to apprehend a criminal, knowing the intention with which
such private person interposes, then such person so killing is guilty of r n ~ r d e r . ~

Reading this statute, the general counsel to St. Clare Hospital in New Jersey
advised the hospital and the physicians that terminating treatment on this patient
at the request of her family would qualify as homicide and would make them
vulnerable to prosecution by the state. On this point, both the Quinlans' own
lawyer and the prosecuting authorities of the State of New Jersey agreed. No
one argued that the New Jersey homicide statute did not mean what it said and
say what it meant. The question was not whether the homicide statute was being
read correctly but whether there was another source of law that might govern
the situation and override the homicide statute.
I n re Quinlan is thus a case in which the deductive application of a rule of
law to a particular case was uncontroverted. If the only question had been
whether termination of treatment constituted homicide within the New Jersey
statute, Quinlan would have been an easy case. What made it complicated and
interesting is that the Quinlans' lawyer argued, and the New Jersey Supreme
Court agreed, that there were other sources of law superior to the New Jersey
homicide statute that could be read to privilege the termination of treatment
on Karen and to disable the state from prosecuting for homicide those persons
who might participate in terminating treatment pursuant to the procedures set
forth in the opinion. In re Quinlan held that the permanently unconscious patient
in a persistent vegetative state has a personal privacy interest, protected under
The homicide characterization furnished the basis for popular argument over whether such termination, when done out of sympathy for the patient, might be characterized as "euthanasia"and
be under some circumstancesallowed; however, there is no "euthanasia"exception to the homicide
statutes. An intentional killing of a human being is homicide regardless of the motive of the killer.
Whether a prosecutor would actually have prosecuted, or a jury have convicted, a physician who
terminated treatment on a patient in Karen Quinlan's situation is of course doubtful; however,
a competent lawyer would have advised medical professionals that there would be some risk of
prosecution and some chance, however remote, of conviction.
This provision has been replaced by the New Jersey Code of Criminal Justice, Chapter 11,
Section 3. The new provision is part of the basis for the legal expert system discussed in Section 2
and illustrated in Appendices A and C.
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New Jersey law, the New Jersey constitution, and the United States Constitution,
to refuse medical treatment consisting of life-support being provided for the
sole purpose of maintaining the patient in the vegetative state, where the
prognosis is that the patient will not return to a cognitive, sapient state. The
patient's interest may be protected by the guardian, acting in accordance with
procedures set forth in the Quinlan case designed to ensure that the decision
is made in accordance with appropriate medical standards and in a manner not
inconsistent with the privilege of medical professionals not to be commanded
by laypersons to make treatment decisions that are contrary to their ethical
views.
The Quinlan case is an unusually interesting and instructive instance of a case
in which a court is faced with a problem of selecting which legal rules and
principles to apply in the circumstances of the case before it. It must be
remembered that there is no "case" unless lawyers are willing to present to the
court conflicting versions of the law or the facts of the matter in controversy.
In the Quinlan situation there was no significant controversy over the facts;
consequently, if the Quinlan family had simply acquiesced in the version of
the law articulated by the hospital's attorney, there would have been no case.
However, the Quinlans believed that as the family of the patient they ought
to have the power to decide when to terminate use of the respirator and the
right that the state not interfere with the exercise of that power, and were convinced that the law in fact would uphold their position once the question was
posed squarely to the court. It was only because they sought out a different
lawyer who brought strikingly different intellectual resources to the argument
of the case that the Quinlans were able to present to the court an alternative
view of what the law ought to be. In the end, the Quinlans' view of what the
law would be declared to be, was largely prophetic: The New Jersey Supreme
Court gave them nearly the full measure of the relief that they sought.
If the Quinlans and their lawyer prevailed because they correctly anticipated
that the federal constitutional privacy interests and the idea of personal
autonomy in medical decision-making would be invoked by the New Jersey
Supreme Court to limit the scope of the New Jersey homicide statute, does that
mean that the lawyer for the hospitaI was wrong? Clearly not: the position that
he took was in accordance with "the law" as any good lawyer would have
understood it. On the other hand, good lawyers would also have seen, and did
see, the intellectual force of the evolving jurisprudence of privacy and individual
autonomy. Most of these strains of legal thinking were not yet part of "the law,"
in the narrow sense, of patient care prior to In re Quinlan, but were plainly
positioned to be deployed in this context. How would lawyers have known that?
This issue poses the most difficult - and perhaps insoluble - problem for the
developer of legal expert systems: How does a good lawyer know what sources
of law might be available to be deployed in argument in a particular case?
Quinlan is, of course, an unusual case in that it is a paradigm-shifting case and
therefore is unusually dramatic in the way in which it repositions the legal
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argument with respect to the entire universe of medical decision-making.
However, Quinlan is only an extreme example of the kind of reasoning that
courts and lawyers do every day: Legal reasoning is as much a matter of selecting
the rules to apply, as it is of interpreting rules by deciding what characterizations
should be regarded as controlling, and "applying" the rules thus selected and
interpreted deductively to particular fact situations. Courts of course have the
authority to decide which rules and principles will be invoked or deployed; the
primary role of lawyers in litigation is to present their clients' stories to the courts
in the most sympathetic light and to propose to the court rules and principles
advantageous to their clients for deductive "application" in the particular case.
The good lawyer must be aware of the range of rules and principles that might
be proposed by competent practitioners, of the arguments that must be met.
Good lawyers typically, not atypicaIly, reach outside of the apparent legal
domain, the most obvious "subject matter," for principles and analogies. In fact,
the hallmark of the best lawyers is their peripheral vision, their ability to see
trouble or opportunity at the margin of the terrain. Is it remotely possible that
a computerized expert system could either emulate the performance of those
lawyers, or point lawyers in the right direction? Can a legal expert system, in
other words, help good lawyers become better ones, or are the requirements
of computability such that the real essence of the legal art cannot be captured?
In order to approach that question it is necessary to discover how lawyers
recognize the resources that are available to them in legal reasoning. We shall
approach the reasoning in In re Quinlan with that task in mind.
A. The Legal and Factual Beginning Position
Let us begin at the beginning. What were the powers and rights of patients prior
to Quinlan, and what were the powers and duties of families and medical professionals? Karen was an adult, 21 years old at the time when she was admitted
to the hospital. Ordinarily, a patient, if competent, has the legal power to consent
to treatment or to withhold consent, and a doctor has a duty not to administer
treatment without the informed consent of the patient; the corollary is that the
patient has a right that the doctor not administer treatment unless the patient
has consented. However, where the patient is unable to give informed consent
but is in a condition in which any reasonable person would consent, e.g., in
an emergency or where the patient is unconscious or otherwise temporarily
incapacitated, the patient's consent to treatment that is medically necessary and
within the standard of care is implied in law. Karen Quinlan, having been
admitted to the hospital as an emergency patient in a comatose state, was
therefore presumed to have consented to treatment that was within the standard
of medical care, which of course included the use of life-support technology
where medically indicated.
As the law stood in 1975, it was not clear that Karen would have had the
legal power to refuse to be placed on the respirator had she been sufficiently
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conscious and competent to give or withhold informed consent upon her
admission to the hospital. It was generally true that competent patients had
the power to withhold consent to treatment. However, where they attempted
to exercise the power under circumstances in which they might die if the treatment were not rendered, the courts tended to exercise their parens patriae powers
in order to compel treatment (ALR 1964). The typical situation would be that
of a terminally ill patient, for example, a cancer patient undergoing painful and
protracted treatment such as radical surgery; the usual procedure when such
a patient attempted to refuse treatment was for the hospital to petition the court
for (a) a declaration that the patient was behaving irrationally and was mentally
incompetent to make medical decisions and (b) the appointment of a guardian
to consent to treatment.5 The patient's desire to die rather than to undergo
treatment would be regarded as evidence of the patient's mental incompetence
to make medical decisions in a rational manner. There had been several federal
constitutional cases involving Jehovah's Witnesses who claimed a right to forgo
receiving blood transfusions even though they might die as a result of the refusal;
in the context of these cases the courts had articulated the proposition that the
state had an interest in the preservation of life even over the patient's religious
objection to treatment, where the state's interest in preserving life, preventing
suicide, protecting the interests of innocent third parties (e.g., children), and
protecting the ethical integrity of the medical profession outweighed the patient's
interest in allowing the life to be terminated. Using this balancing test, those
courts that had published decisions in the Jehovah's Witnesses cases had generally
ordered Jehovah's Witnesses to undergo blood transfusions rather than die
(Application of President & Directors of Georgetown College, Inc., 118 U.S.
App. D.C. 80, 330 F2d 1000, 9 ALR 3d 1367 (D.C. Cir. 1964), cert. den., 337
U.S. 978, 84 S.Ct. 1883, 12 L.Ed. 2d 746 (1964)). It was against this essential
background that the Quinlan case arose. The rights of even competent patients
were in doubt.
This was not to say that actual refusals of treatment, and actual decisions
on the part of medical professionals to terminate treatment, were not commonplace by 1975. The dissemination of medical technology through the construction
of modern hospitals had meant that by the mid-1970s intensive care units and
life-support technologies had become widely available. Since the dominant ethic
of the medical profession is to treat aggressively even in doubtful cases, it was
inevitable that these technologies would be used on a wider range of patients
than those who could be restored effectively to a satisfactory condition, and
therefore inevitable that the discontinuance of life supports on some patients
would be viewed as medically appropriate. The current state of medical practice
was, in other words, that acts that the law characterized as homicide were
See N.J.Stat.Ann.38:12-36 (1983) and its predecessor, R.S. 3:21-3; 3:21-4, amended by L.1938,
c . 133, p. 285, $1.If a person has been adjudged a mental incompetent and a guardian of his person
appointed, the court has, under New Jersey law, "full authority over the ward's person and all
matters relating thereto."
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being committed routinely in major hospitals as a matter of ordinary medical
decision-making. In addition, there were a number of patients in the situation
of Karen Ann Quinlan: patients who had been rendered permanently unconscious by some adverse acute episode but whose brain stems were intact and
who might be kept in a vegetative state for a very long time without hope of
recovering cognitive function. Since these patients were typically capable of
maintaining circulatory and respiratory functions on their own, the usual course
of practice in major hospitals was to wean them from the life-support systems
when their condition had stabilized and to transfer them to skilled nursing
facilities. Karen’s physicians were persuaded, however, that she could not be
weaned, so the case was tried on the theory that Quinlan herself fit into the
category of patients on whom termination of life-support would likely mean
death (Quinlan case 1976).
The New Jersey courts therefore faced a conceptual problem that was also
an intensely practical problem. Medical professionals were inclined, in the
exercise of their professional judgment, to commit acts that technically constituted homicide. It was likely that they were aware of the existence of the
homicide statutes’and were in some instances influenced by the risk of prosecution to make treatment decisions that they would not otherwise have viewed
as medically appropriate. The homicide laws did not, however, quite fit the
situation of medical professionals and their patients in the modern hospital.
The medical professionals came under an obligation not to cease treatment only
because they had commenced treatment in the first place with the patient‘s
consent, express or implied, in an effort to save the patient’s life. Having assumed
the professional relationship, they had a duty to provide treatment within the
standard of care, and had a further duty not to abandon the patient in a situation
in which the patient could not survive without their ministrations. In addition,
it seemed, the law imposed upon them an obligation to protect the patient’s
life by continuing life-sustaining treatment once it had been commenced. All
of their duty and privilege to treat the patient depended, however, in the first
instance on the patient’s having consented to be treated. Indeed, the consent
basis of the relationship between doctor and patient is so central that when a
guardian is appointed to make medical decisions for a patient the guardian is
authorized to consent to treatment (N.J.S.A. 3A:22-1 Exercising power of consent
for mental incompetent; order, effect). Because the entire doctor-patient relationship pivots on the patient‘s consent, so must the duties that undergird the obligation to continue treatment, and so must also the application of the homicide
statute to any decision to terminate treatment.
It was the law that determined the powers of the patient, or the patient’s
guardian, to consent to treatment or to withhold consent. It was therefore the
law that would determine when treatment might be terminated. However, the
question for the New Jersey Supreme Court was what the law ought to be in
the case of a permanently unconscious patient. Plainly the notion, implicit in
the homicide statute, that the medical professionals must d o nothing that would
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hasten the patient's death was neither realistic as a practical matter nor supported
by the medical, religious or ethical authorities that had focused their attention
on the problem. Even Pope Pius XII, speaking out of the Catholic Church's
principled opposition to "euthanasia" had said some 18 years before the Quinlan
matter arose that a family had a right to refuse to consent to the use of modern
respiratory apparatus in cases of "deep unconsciousness" where the case was
"completely hopeless" and the use of the apparatus might be deemed "extraordinary." The Pope's position was that the physicians had no right to insist
on treatment over the family's opposition, and that the interruption of attempts
at resuscitation is not euthanasia, even when as a physical matter the interruption
of such efforts would cause the arrest of circulation. Pius XI1 had applied to
this problem the principle of "double effect." (The "allocutio" to anesthesiologists
delivered by Pius XI1 on November 24, 1957 is quoted in Quinlan 1976, 31.)
There was and is no legal concept within homicide law that functions in the
same manner as the Catholic principle of "double effect." The Catholic principle
is that an act that is physically the cause of death may not be morally the cause
of death because of the actor's admirable motivation in committing the act that
foreseeably will lead to the death. The law of homicide, on the other hand,
does not contain an exception for well-motivated killings, or for killings that
are incidental to good deeds. Good lawyers conversant with the law of homicide
would never have doubted that the disconnecting of the respirator would
"cause," in both the physical and legal senses, whatever cessation of respiration might occur in the patient thereafter.
On the other hand, notions of causation within the law are bound up with
concepts of responsibility, and legal responsibility in both civil tort and criminal
law depends on the proposition, not only that the actor physically caused an
event complained of, but that the actor had a duty not to cause the event. If
the medical professionals were to be vulnerable to prosecution for ceasing to
treat Karen, that vulnerability must derive from their having a duty to treat.
Since their duty derived in the first instance from the patient's consent, a holding
by the court that the patient could exercise the power to withdraw consent would
necessarily imply that the medical professionals would, if the patient exercised
that power, cease to have a duty to treat, and would even have a duty not to
treat. A holding in favor of the Quinlans on the question of their power to
withdraw consent to treatment would necessarily, then, influence the reading
of the homicide statute: It would be inconsistent and incoherent for the law
to acknowledge the physicians' duty to cease treatment and at the same time
make them liable to prosecution for homicide for having caused the consequences
of cessation. It was therefore not so obvious as it might first have appeared
that the homicide statute applied to instances of terminating treatment on a
permanently unconscious patient: That reading of the homicide statute presupposed that the physicians had a duty to continue treatment, and it was
precisely that idea that the Quinlans challenged by claiming that they or Karen
had a constitutionally protected power to withdraw consent.
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The Quinlans could only prevail in this line of reasoning if the court were
to agree that their interests or Karen's outweighed the interest of the state in
the preservation of life. The state's interest in this case was both general and
specific: The general policy against the taking of life is expressed in the homicide
statute, and, in addition, the state had a specific parens patriae responsibility
toward Karen herself because she was legally incompetent. Karen Quinlan was
technically a ward of the state and therefore was within the equity jurisdiction
of the probate court. The central conceptual problems in the case, therefore,
were (a) what was the state's parens patriae responsibility toward a patient in
Karen's condition; and (b) was Joseph Quinlan an appropriate person to exercise
this responsibility by delegation from the court? The New Jersey Supreme Court
cited with approval the lower court judge's formulation of the powers of the
state exercising parens patriae power:
As part of the inherent power of equity, a Court of Equity has full and complete jurisdiction over the persons of those who labor under any legal disability. . . .The Court's
action in such a case is not limited by any narrow bounds, but it is empowered to stretch
forth its arm in whatever direction its aid and protection may be needed. . . .(137
N.J.Super, at 254, quoted in Quinlan case 1976, 44)

These powers are to be exercised for the benefit of the ward,6 the usual formulation of the standard that is to govern their exercise is that the court is to act
in the "best interests" of the ward. It is important to keep this point in mind,
because it is crucial to realize in thinking about the Quinlan case that the powers
of the guardian appointed by the court are delegated from the court, acting
as the state in its parens patriae capacity, to the guardian. That is, the guardian
is the agent of the state and is bound by the same duties that bind the state
itself. The guardian is authorized to act for the benefit of the patient, not for
his own private interest. Moreover, the court has an obligation to select only
appropriate guardians, since they are to make the judgments that constitute
the exercise of the state's parens patriae power. In the exercise of this equity
probate jurisdiction, which is fundamentally an administrative function rather
than a dispute resolution function, the courts formulate and act upon the state's
ethical obligations towards its citizens who labor under legal disabilities; the
foremost duty of the state toward its wards is to protect them when they are
unable to do so for themselves. The Quinlan situation raised the possibility that
the state's duties in its parens pntriae role vis-A-vis particular permanently
unconscious patients such as Karen Ann Quinlan might coincide with the duties
apparently imposed by the general homicide statute, which is also an expression
of the state's policy of protecting life. The question was whether the equity

'

The current version of the New Jersey statute defining the powers of the court is found at N.J.S.A.
3B:12-49 (1982). The New Jersey code is similarly clear that if a guardian is appointed as to the
person or estate of a mentally incompetent person the court still has "a full authority over the wards
person and all matters relating thereto" (N.J.S.A.38:12-36 (1982)).
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courts exercising their parens patriae powers ought to feel themselves bound
by the homicide statute‘s implicit directive that treatment might never be
withdrawn or withheld from a person defined still as alive, or whether the state
in managing the medical affairs of its wards ought to move in the direction of
the emerging medical and religious standards for the treatment of permanently
unconscious and terminally ill patients.
Let us be clear, therefore, about the particular package of legal questions that
were before the New Jersey Supreme Court in the Quinlan case. The interests
at stake were those of the patient, her guardian, her family, the doctors, the
hospital, the state in its role as enforcer of the general laws of the state, and
the state in its role as parens patriae. The precise legal questions before the court
were (a) whether to appoint Joseph Quinlan as Karen’s guardian and (b)whether
to give him explicit authorization to terminate the life-support apparatus. At
the time when the case arose, the apparent state of the law was that the state’s
interest in the preservation of life, expressed in the homicide statute and
reinforced by the behavior of the courts exercising their equity probate jurisdiction, was paramount to the interests of families in terminating treatment on
patients for whom they assumed responsibilities, and might even outweigh the
interests of the patient herself. The Quinlan family, by contrast, relying heavily
on the intellectual structure of the Catholic teachings, was arguing (a) that their
decision to terminate life-supports on Karen was not morally objectionable and
therefore ought not be legally objectionable and (b) that the powers of the family
or the patient to make decisions of this nature was protected by the New Jersey
and United States Constitutions and could not be interfered with by the state
either by a homicide prosecution or by the court‘s denying the guardianship
to Joseph Quinlan or declining to acknowledge, in the declaratory order that
they sought, that he had the power to order discontinuance of life-supports.

B. The Guardianship
Although the core of the legal doctrinal issue was the nature of the state‘s interest,
from which would flow the standards for selecting a guardian, the court chose
to address first the question whether Joseph Quinlan was a fit guardian. In
context, the consequence of this technique of proceeding was to qualify the
guardian first, then to decide that the state’s interests might safely be entrusted
to him when he was operating through the procedures set forth in the opinion,
rather than to decide first on the state’s interest and then to authorize the
guardian to carry out the state‘s wishes. The method by which the opinion is
constructed is itself symbolic of the deference to family and attending physicians
that also is the substance of the legal standard that the court articulates.
This guardianship proceeding was highly unusual. In the ordinary case, there
is no occasion to doubt that the guardian of an incompetent patient in a hospital
is the patient’s next of kin. What is ordinarily required in the hospital setting
is a person who can consent on behalf of the patient to medical treatment, and
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consult with the physicians about treatment options. It is not customary to seek
the formal appointment of a guardian for an incompetent patient for the purpose
of obtaining consent to medical treatment, if the same persons who qualify to
be appointed guardian under applicable statutes are in fact participating in the
decisions regarding the care of the patient. In addition, it bears pointing out
that it is customary for treating physicians and hospital personnel to consult
with whatever family members appear to be most informed and involved in
the patient's care, not only with the unique individual who would be appointed
guardian by the court.
The Quinlans were therefore presumed from the beginning of Karen's hospitalization to be the appropriate persons to make medical decisons for Karen; parents
of an unmarried adult incompetent had the statutory preference for the guardianship.7It was only when Joeph Quinlan tried to exercise what he thought was
his power to withdraw consent to treatment that the hospital's attorney advised
Mr. Quinlan that he did not have that power, forcing the Quinlans into court
to request formal letters of guardianship with express authorization to discontinue life-supports. It was in this context that Joseph Quinlan's personal
fitness as guardian was drawn into question, the problem being that he had
already expressed his belief :hat his guardianship powers could and ought to
be exercised in a manner that informed lawyers would regard as homicide under
the New Jersey statute.
The fact that Joseph Quinlan had already made up his mind that no extraordinary measures ought to be taken to preserve Karen's life presented a difficulty
for the court. If the court disagreed with the prospective guardian's view of
his responsibilities and was disinclined to affirm his power to discontinue the
life-support apparatus, it ought not grant him the letters of guardianship at all,
because he would be likely to make all of his decisions with respect to treatment in a manner consistent with his own beliefs. At best the court might
anticipate continuing tension between the guardian and the treating physicians;
at worst, the guardian might use his acknowledged powers in a manner inconsistent with the state's obligations toward the ward. The trial court had resolved
this dilemma by appointing Joseph Quinlan the guardian only of the property
of Karen; and by appointing another guardian for her person, with authority
to make medical decisions for her. The issue of Joseph Quinlan's fitness as
guardian was therefore inescapably before the New Jersey Supreme Court
because it was being asked to reverse the trial court on this point and grant
letters of guardianship to Joseph Quinlan as the guardian of both the person
and the property of his daughter.
The fitness of a person for a task depends on the definition of the task. It

The New Jersey statute provided that letters of guardianship for a mentally incompetent adult
should be granted to the spouse, if the incompetent and spouse were living as man and wife at
the time the incompetency arose, or to his heirs. The parents of an unmarried adult are his or her
first "heirs"in the line of intestate succession. See the current version at N.J.S.A.3B:12-25 (1983).
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would be incoherent to address the question of the fitness of Joseph Quinlan
as guardian without addressing the question of what he was expected to do as
guardian, exercising the powers of the state. It is good practice to think about
the usual case before proceeding to consider the kind of extraordinary situation
posed by the Quinlan matter. In the ordinary case of intrafamily guardianship,
there is little or no judicial supervision of the conduct of the guardian, in the
absence of some reason to believe that the guardian is abusing power. The
guardian is simply instructed to manage the wards affairs for the benefit of
the ward. Although the standard by which the guardian is to be guided is the
"best interest" of the ward, the courts do not purport to give extensive guidance
in particular cases as to what the ward's best interests might be. The guardian
exercises his or her judgment as to what is in the wards interest. To a significant
degree, therefore, the guardian designs his or her own task.
In this case, however, it was claimed that there was a limit on the guardian's
power to take a specific action. Why? Surely the guardian had general authority
to give informed consent to treatment, which necessarily involves the exercise
of choice and judgment. It could not be the case, therefore, that the guardian
was required to consent to all treatment options preferred by the physicians,
since in the exercise of his guardianship powers he had all the powers that the
ward might exercise, which includes the power to choose. He clearly had general
power to deny as well as to give consent. The question was whether he might
refuse to continue consent to this kind of treatment under these circumstances.
This problem comes down to the question whether the guardian has power
to exercise all of the medical decision-making power that the ward might herself
exercise. The "best interests" test suggests otherwise. That test requires the
guardian to administer the property of the ward in a manner that would be
thought of as selfish if the ward were to take those same actions. We might
think of this as the "selfish best interests" standard. Likewise, the "best interests"
standard has been thought to require the guardian to administer the person of
the ward in a manner that best promotes the wards physical, mental and moral
well-being, the most basic of these being the physical.
The "best interests" standard has not been, however, the sole measure of the
guardian's duty. In the context of managing the financial assets of wards, the
courts developed the concept of "substituted judgment" to deal with situations
in which a guardian administering a wards assets under the "best interests" test
would be forced to behave more selfishly on the ward's behalf than the ward
arguably would have wished. The doctrine of "substituted judgment" was first
developed in the eighteenth century in England to allow guardians to contribute,
on behalf of their wards, some of their wards' income to the support of family
members who required support, on the ground that the ward would have wished
to have discharged his or her obligations as a member of a family. The concept
traveled to the United States, and has been invoked, for example, to allow
guardians to distribute assets to the wards devisees in advance of the ward's
death in order to avoid estate taxes (See Mutter of Trott, 118 N.J. Super.
~
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436, 288 A.2d 303 (1972)). Although the concept belongs mainly to the domain
of estate planning, and has been used to authorize the guardian to do what a
reasonable and prudent person would do in the management of his or her own
estate, the concept had been used by several state courts in the medical context
to authorize organ transplants between siblings where the donor sibling was
mentally incompetent, on the ground that the court may authorize to be done
that which the incompetent might do if he had his faculties. The court has, in
other words, all of the powers of the incompetent including the power to act
against the incompetent's "best interests" narrowly and selfishly defined, if a
reasonable and prudent person might so act (See Hurt u. Brown, 29 Conn.
Sup. 368, 289 A.2d 386 (1972)).
It must be pointed out here that the court has these powers, and that the
"substituted judgment" test does not involve a search for the ward's subjective
intent or judgment, but rather authorizes the court and guardian to select among
the options that a reasonable and prudent person would regard as appropriate
exercises of good judgment under the circumstances. Some of those options might
not meet the narrow concept of "selfish best interests."
AIthough the "substituted judgment" concept had been deployed mainly to
authorize altruistic acts on behalf of the ward, there was no reason in principle
why it might not be deployed to authorize the court and guardian to search
for reasonable and prudent treatment options for a permanently unconscious
patient where those options might not be regarded as being within the "best
interests" of the patient defined narrowly as the preservation of biological life.
Indeed, that is exactly how the New Jersey Supreme Court used the concept.
The guardianship of Karen Quinlan was to be governed by the "substituted
judgment" rather than the "best interests" standard.'
Having arrived at this point, the question was how the "substituted judgment"
test might be used in the Quinlan context. Joseph Quinlan was arguing that
a reasonable and prudent guardian might decide in the circumstances to discontinue use of the respirator that was sustaining Karen's breathing. Once it
had been decided that the "substituted judgment" standard applied to define
Joseph Quinlan's duty, the question was whether he was correct or not in his
assessment of what a reasonable and prudent person might regard as appropriate.
This is an empirical inquiry: The question for the court was what the best
contemporary thinking was on the problem of terminating treatment.
The court approached that question by inquiring into the quality of Joseph
Quinlan's character, motivation and sincerity. Since Quinlan was arguing that
his request for power to authorize disconnection of the respirator was in accord
with the teachings of his faith, an evaluation of his motivation and sincerity
It bears noting that the logic that has just been traced out is implicit rather than explicit in the
opinion: The New Jersey Supreme Court simply invoked the "substitutedjudgment" test without
explaining that it is an exception to the general "best interests"standard, and the court is uncommonly
elliptical in its discussion of the implications of having evoked the "substitutedjudgment" standard
in this context.
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afforded the court an opportunity to set forth in some detail in the opinion the
Catholic teachings on which Quinlan was relying for guidance. The New Jersey
court was not, however, at liberty to authorize Joseph Quinlan to terminate
treatment on Karen simply on the ground that that action would have been
consistent with the Catholic teaching.' Nor could it adopt the Catholic position
as the law of New Jersey simply because it was the Catholic position, or because
the teachings went to the heart of the problem of how to think about medical
treatment for permanently unconscious patients, and were perhaps at the time
the only source of authoritative religious guidance on the problem of refusing to
continue life-supports. Under the rules of recognition that apply within civil
courts, the teachings of the Catholic Church do not serve as authoritative sources
of law. However, the existence or content of religious teachings may be relevant
to the formulation or application of a legal standard. In this case, the court
treated the Catholic teachings as relevant to three different legal issues: (a) the
qualification of Joseph Quinlan to be guardian; (b) the appropriateness of utilizing the "substituted judgment" standard for defining the powers of the guardian
in a case involving a permanently unconscious patient; and (c) the range of
options that might be regarded as appropriate for the exercise of "substituted
judgment ."
The interplay between the question of the fitness of the guardian and the
content of the "substituted judgment" test as invoked in this setting now becomes
apparent. In the evaluation of Joseph Quinlan's qualifications, then, his and
his family's Catholic faith, the care that they exercised in coming to the position
that they eventually took on the matter of terminating treatment, and the
teachings of the Church on the issue of refusing "extraordinary" care become
relevant, and the court decides that there is no reason to defeat the statutory
order of preference for the appointment of guardian that is in the probate code
(Quinlan case 1976, 53).

C. The State's Interest and the Federal Consfifution
After the court had decided that Joseph Quinlan's petition for guardianship
would be granted, it then acted on Quinlan's request that he be authorized to
have the respirator disconnected. This bit of ordering in the opinion bears
mention. Judicial opinions, although purporting to set out the reasons why the
court reached the result that it reached, rarely reflect either the order in which
Joseph Quinlan had argued that the state was required to acknowledge his power to terminate
treatment and to refrain from interfering with it because the exercise of his power would constitute
the free exercise of his religion, protected under the First Amendment. The court rejected this
argument, however, on the ground that a persoriclaiming the right to be free from state inference
with conduct based on religious belief must be able to demonstrate that the state would force an
action inconsistent with religious belief. In the Quinlan situation, the Catholic teaching was that
patients and their families might, not must, refuse extraordinary means of treatment. The case was
thus distinguishable from, for example, the case of a Jehovah's Witness who would maintain that
being forced to accept a blood transfusion would constitute drinking blood in violation of Biblical
command and would result in the damnation of the soul. See 355 A.2d 647, 661-62 (1975).
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the court reached its conclusions or the decision tree that underlies the progression of reasoning. If, as in the Quinlan decision, the court responds to the
questions that the petitioner raised in the order in which he raised them, the
apparent progression of reasoning in the opinion may well mislead the reader
as to the underlying logic of the decision. In addition, a reader who is not
conversant with the particular areas of the law that the court invokes may also
think that the opinion reveals on its face a larger fraction of the law that one
must know in order to understand the opinion than is actually the case. A judicial
opinion supplies pieces of a mosaic constantly under construction; the court's
reasoning, if competently executed, will have been positioned to be coherent
within and consistent with other legal rules and principles that govern the
domain. The task of extracting the structure of the reasoning usually requires
a knowledge of the domain that goes far beyond the particular opinion being
analyzed.
If the Quinlan court had organized its opinion in accordance with the actual
structure of its reasoning, the qualifications of the guardian ought to have been
evaluated last, not first, since the qualifications could not be determined prior
to the court's having defined the task. The choice to proceed by evaluating the
guardian first, however, allowed the court the opportunity to set forth early
in the opinion the Catholic teachings. These teachings are central to the opinion
in both a strategic and a substantive sense. Although the Pope's statement does
not and cannot serve as a source of law within the civil courts, it does perform
a crucial role in the design of the opinion: The principles that Pius XI1 articulated
- that patients have personal autonomy in consenting or declining to consent
to treatment, that families are ordinarily best situated to make critical medical
decisions for their mentally incompetent members, that physicians ought to abide
by the wishes of patients and their families - are principles deeply embedded
in the law, reflected in the doctrine of informed consent and in the statutory
preference for next of kin as guardian.
Why, however, did the New Jersey Supreme Court have to rely on the Pope's
speech for these principles rather than on prior judicial authorities? Here we
encounter a peculiar feature of the practice of judicial opinion-writing, one that
has considerable implications for developers of expert systems in law. Courts
are strikingly reluctant to invoke fundamental principle in writing opinions if
there is an intermediate body of doctrine available to serve as the foundation
for their reasoning. Courts tend to assume rather than assert the structure of
values that underlies legal doctrine; their caution about using general propositions of law directly in legal reasoning is reflected in the maxim "general
principles do not decide specific cases," which reflects a preference for propositions of law that have arisen out of actual decisions in actual cases and that
therefore have been part of some exercise in practical reasoning. It is
consequently difficult in many areas of the law to find in the body of judicial
writing a crisp statement of the principles that inform the areas, even though
it may be not at all difficult for skilled lawyers to infer them from the decided
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cases. Although such principles are most often not stated, they are nevertheless
lurking there as a kind of shadow logic." When, then, a court needs to invoke
fundamental principle, and to cite authority for that principle, it may have
difficulty finding judicial authority; yet, if the court articulates the principle
in its own voice the court may appear to be inventing the principle rather than
articulating what is understood among practitioners to be part of the essential
intellectual structure of the field. Pius XII's speech to the anesthesiologists, of
course, articulates principles that are common both to the common law and
to Catholic doctrine; but the court's having accorded such prominence to it must
be regarded as a reflection of the court's inability to find judicial authority
directly on point, which the Pope's statement most robustly was.
Pope Pius' statement also has the great merit, from the point of view of the
court, of setting up the conflict as one occurring between patients and their
families, on the one hand, and physicians on the other. This is a plausible
characterization of the practical problem that families such as the Quinlans were
facing, because it was the physicians' and hospital's insistence on continuing
to provide the life-supports that gave rise to the legal conflict with the family.
In the contemplation of the law, however, the physicians had no legal privilege
to continue treatment once begun simply because they would have preferred to
continue it. If someone has the power to withdraw consent and they exercise
that power, then the physician cannot continue to treat without committing
battery. The only reason why the physicians could assert a privilege to continue
to treat over the patient's family's objection was that the state, in its parens
patriae function through the probate court, was unwilling to delegate to the
guardian authority to withdraw consent to treatment. The legal question before
the New Jersey Supreme Court was whether it should allow its probate courts
the power to withdraw consent, and, if so, whether the power might be delegated
to a guardian. The central issue in the case, therefore, was the state's interest,
since the state might override the wishes of patient or family; and the question
was whether the state was going to side with the physicians or the family or
chart an independent course.
The Quinlan situation posed an interesting dilemma for the court. Once having
invoked the "substituted judgment" standard to govern medical decision-making
for permanently unconscious patients, it had to decide what powers to allow
the probate courts in using that standard. The danger was that the "substituted
judgment" standard would allow probate courts and guardians to act against
medical advice, raising the possibility that medical professionals might be
required to take actions that they felt did not comport with their professional
standards and responsibilities, which the state itself recognizes and enforces in
the malpractice standard. The question was whether the "substituted judgment"
Drawing out the shadow logic of judicial reasoning is one of the principal functions of the kind
of academic writing that consists of making true statements about the law. Susskind refers to this
kind of statement as a "law-statement" (Susskind 1987, 34-40).
lo
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standard might be used to force medical professionals to commit an act that
professionals would regard as not in accord with their best judgment in light
of standards and practices prevailing.in the profession. The court's answer to
this question is unequivocally in the negative, although its reasoning is unclear.
It observes that although the courts have the power to exercise "substituted
judgment" it is inappropriate for them to overrule medical decisions made in
accordance with "standards and practice prevailing in the profession" (Quinlan
case 1976, 45). Therefore, the court holds, the lower court was correct in not
authorizing withdrawal of the respirator, because Karen's physicians had made
their decision in accordance with existing medical standards and practices as
they understood them and as they had been proved in the trial in the lower
court (Quinlan case 1976, 45).
In context, this holding seems anomalous. The Quinlans had, after all, asked
for authority to have the respirator on Karen disconnected, which would seem
to mean authority to tell the particular physicians to disconnect the respirator.
It was odd, therefore, for the New Jersey Supreme Court to begin its discussion
of the state's interest by approving the decision of the trial court not to order
the discontinuance of the respirator. Moreover, the court appears to hold that
the probate court has a duty to medical professionals not to order them to
practice medicine in a manner inconsistent with their standards even when
exercising the parens patriae power under the "substituted judgment" standard.
In fact, however, this part of the opinion displays the subtlety of the court's
approach to the matter. The court separates the question (a) whether the court
acting on behalf of the patient has authority to withdraw consent to treatment
from the question (b) whether the court can order particular unwilling medical
professionals to deliver the specific kind of treatment that the court wants the
ward to receive. The court responds by affirming the trial court's decision in
declining to authorize withdrawal of the respirator, although clearly recognizing
the authority of the court to authorize such withdrawal, and thus protects the
conscience of the individual medical professional.
The conscience of the individual medical professional is not to be confused,
however, with the standards of the medical profession itself. These, insofar as
the court understands them, are central to the court's analysis of the state's
interest. Let us recall the court's dilemma. It is that the policy of the homicide
statute may be an inappropriate guide to the exercise of the state's parens pafn'ae
responsibility toward permanently unconscious or terminally ill patients. If the
homicide statute is not to control, and if the "substituted judgment" standard
is to be used, to what should a court or guardian exercising "substituted judgment" look for guidance as to what the state's interest is? The standard is that
"substituted judgment" may be used to select an option that a reasonable and
prudent person would select. In this case, the question would be whether a
reasonable and prudent person would select termination of the life-support
apparatus.
Of course there is no compelling reason why a reasonable prudent person
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should be confined to a range of treatment options that allopathic physicians
view as appropriate, and the court does not assert that the ”substituted judgment”
standard is bounded by conventional medical practice. The question that the
court asks is this: Is there a universal medical standard for treatment for
permanently unconscious and terminally ill patients so contrary to the granting
of the authority that Joseph Quinlan is requesting that the state should bar the
relief that he seeks? (Quinlan case 1976, 45). This question implies some close
relationship between the state’s interest and the medical standards of care, but
it is not clear what that interest is because the court in this case looks to the
medical standards of care only to determine whether they bar the treatment
option that the guardian prefers. Most tellingly, in this situation the court finds
that it is actually in the state’s interest as parens patriae to take account of the
fact that physicians must terminate treatment on some patients, because it is
likely that the treatment decisions that the physicians actually make are influenced
by their fear of liability, inducing a self-regarding consideration into medical
decision-making that detracts from the physician’s inclination to consider
foremost the interests of the patient (Quinlan case 1976, 46).
Does, then, the state have a parens patriae interest in this case that leads it
to compel the continuance of life-supports for Karen? The opinion discards every
ground in state law for thinking so. Moreover, the court deploys the emerging
federal constitutional jurisprudence of privacy to throw a cloak of federal constitutional protection over the power of Karen and her father, acting, as guardian,
to discontinue treatment. This point is worth mentioning, because the court’s
invocation of the federal privacy interest can easily mislead a less than careful
reader into believing that In re Quinlan is primarily “based on“ Roe u. Wade
(410 U.S. 113,93 S.Ct. 705,35 L.Ed. 2d 147 (1973))the case in which the United
States Supreme Court invalidated state regulation of early abortions, basing
the decision on federal constitutional privacy interests. It is true that the New
Jersey Supreme Court cites Roe u. Wade for the proposition that a federal
privacy interest that is broad enough to encompass a woman‘s right to terminate
a fetus is broad enough to encompass a patient’s decision to decline medical
treatment under certain circumstances (Quinlan case 1976, 40). However, a close
reading of the Quinlan decision reveals that it actually turns on an analysis of
the state’s interest; the federal constitutional point adds weight to the court‘s
analysis of state law, and it effectively immunizes the result from any action
on the part of the New Jersey legislature.
The New Jersey court approaches the federal constitutional question in the
manner characteristic of federal constitutional analysis, weighing the patient’s
interest in privacy against the state‘s interest in preserving her life. The New
Jersey Supreme Court does not relinquish any of the state’s traditional interests
in protecting life, preventing suicide, protecting the rights of third parties, or
protecting the ethics of the medical profession, which have been held to justify
the state‘s exercise of its power to override a patient’s nonconsent to treatment.
However, the Court finds that a permanently unconscious chronically vegetative
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patient has a federally protected privacy interest in refusing medical treatment
that only prolongs that condition with no hope of recovery, and that the patient's
interest outweighs, in the circumstances of the Quinlan situation, the state's
interests in the preservation of the patient's own life (Quinlan case 1976, 41).
The Court arrives at this proposition by examining the rights of the competent
adult patient, who is the paradigmatic legal actor in the American legal system.
A competent patient'' in Karen's condition, the Court points out, could never
be subjected against her will to the type of treatment that Karen was receiving,
the state's interest in the preservation of the patient's life does not extend to
the imposition of painful, intrusive treatments when the prognosis is dim.
What happens when the patient becomes incompetent? The court holds that
Karen does not lose her right of privacy simply by virtue of having become
incompetent. However, the definition of that right becomes problematic. On
the one hand, the court says repeatedly that the family and guardian may "assert"
Karen's rights on her behalf. O n the other hand, not all of the powers that Karen
would have had while competent transfer to her guardian. When the patient
becomes incompetent, the powers that she had as a competent person lapse.
She becomes a ward of the state, which has considerable powers and duties
with respect to her. It is the state's powers and duties that are'delegated to the
guardian; the guardian does not acquire powers or rights as the incompetent's
surrogate. The question for the court is: What powers should the guardian of
a patient in Karen's circumstances have in light of the constitutionally protected
privacy interests that she retains.
The New Jersey court does not attempt to decide Karen's present privacy right;
rather, it decides that the only "practical way" to protect that right is to allow
her guardian and family to decide how she would have exercised it in her present
circumstances. Operationally, this means that the actual content of Karen's
federally protected privacy right consists of an authorization to her guardian
to exercise "substituted judgment" within the procedural constraints laid down
by the court. The court thus arrives at the same practical result on analyzing
both state and federal claims.
The content of the federally protected right, as the New Jersey court articulates
it, turns out to be just what the court thinks appropriate under New Jersey law in
In 1975, it was not clear what privilege to refuse treatment a competent patient might have had,
what right to be free of government interference with the exercise of that privilege; and in any
event a competent patient could not have been in Karen's precise situation because the distinguishing
feature of her situation was her loss of cognitive capacity. The court tries to imagine a competent
Karen. "We have no doubt. . .that if Karen were herself miraculously lucid for an interval (not
altering the existing prognosis of the condition to which she would soon return) and perceptive
of her irreversible condition, she could effectively decide upon discontinuance of the life-support
apparatus, even if it meant the prospect of natural death' (Quinlan case 1976, 39). At best, one
might talk of the autonomy and preferences that the patient had prior to becoming unconscious.
However, evidence of Karen's previously stated preferences and intentions had been regarded by
the trial court as not probative of Karen's considered wishes because they were "remote and
impersonal" (Quinlan case 1976,22). There was thus little reliable evidence of how the patient would
have exercised her autonomy had she been able to do so.
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light of its considered understanding of New Jersey'sparens patriae interest. That
is, the New Jersey court appears to hold that Karen has a right that the guardian
be equipped with authority to exercise a fiduciary judgment as to what a
reasonable and prudent person in Karen's situation might want to have done. The
standard is objective, not subjective, as in the circumstances of the Quinlun case
it must be since Karen's actual wishes could not be ascertained. The patient is still
to be protected by having a guardian governed by a fiduciary standard and acting
within the procedures set forth by the court.

D. Rights and Institutions
Now we come to the rights and duties of the physicians and the hospital in light
of the power and duties of patient, guardian and court as outlined above. One
conspicuous feature of the Quinlun decision is that it is a practical decision about
patient care decision-making within an acute care general hospital, and the order
in the case reflects the court's understanding about how the hospital as an institution works. The order is for this reason very specificin setting forth the procedures
that must be followed if the exception to the homicide statute is to be invoked.
Although the language of the opinion sounds mainly in individualrights discourse,
when it comes to fashioning a remedy, the New Jersey Supreme Court takes a view
of its problem that resonates more with concepts of administrative law than of
constitutional law. The order itself is explicit that it is the physician, not the family,
who initiates the sequence of actions that can result in discontinuance of the lifesupport apparatus. The physician makes the prognosis that the patient will not
return to a cognitive, sapient life and the decision that the life-support ought to
be discontinued. The guardian and family are involved in the process by having
the power to concur, or decline to concur, in this decision; and the role of the ethics
committee is to concur, or decline to concur, in the prognosis.
For someonewho might have read the "constitutional rights" talk in the opinion
as expressing the court's understanding that the opinion rests upon the personal
autonomy of patient and family, the actual order may come as a surprise. The
order is, however, fully consistent with the court's view of the proper allocation of
authority under the "substituted judgment" test within the hospital. What the court
is at pains to do in the Quinlun order, therefore, is to surround the guardian's decision with institutional constraints of the sort available in a modern hospital. The
guardian merely concurs in a medical judgment that must be made by the attending
physician; only after the attending physician has decided that the patient is unlikely
to return to a cognitive, sapient state and the guardian and family have concurred,
is the ethics committee to be consulted. And the physician, with the concurrence
of the guardian and family, makes the decision that the life support apparatus
should be disconnected. The guardian's real authority is in the choice to concur
or not in the physician's decision and in the selection of the physician and hospital;
but a change in either physician or hospital might be difficult as a practical matter.
What is notable about the actual order for declaratory relief in the Quinlan

Synthesizing Related Rules for Legal Expert Systems

293

case, therefore, is that it reflects the New Jersey Supreme Court's concern for
the multiplicity of legal interests and legitimate concerns of the many persons
involved in the case and the integrity of the decision-making process with respect
to discontinuing treatment of chronically vegetative patients rather than
reflecting, as one might expect from the opinion, a more narrowly focused
analysis of the rights of the parties. And so the final lesson of the Quinlan case
for the expert systems developer is that courts not only think about rules and
concepts; they create them. Courts also think about institutions, and the control
of institutional decision-making through legal standards - and they create both
of them, tool None of the lawyers in the Quinlan case anticipated that the order
as it came down would be so focused on procedural protections, which may
be to say that even good lawyers cannot think of everything.

IV. Expert System of In re Quinlan

In In re Quinlan, the New Jersey Supreme Court issued the order for declaratory
relief that follows. (Quinlan case 1976, 54. Spacing is introduced to make the
parts and the relationships between them more apparent .)
.we herewith declare the following affirmative relief on behalf of the plaintiff.
Upon the concurrence of the guardian and family of Karen,
should the responsible attending physicians conclude
that there is no reasonable possibility of Karen's ever emerging from her
present comatose condition to a cognitive, sapient state and
that the life-support apparatus now being administered to Karen should be
discontinued,
they shall consult with the hospital "Ethics Committee" or like body of the institution
in which Karen is then hospitalized.
If
that consultative body agrees that there is no reasonable possibility of Karen's ever
emerging from her present comatose condition to a cognitive, sapient state,
the present life-support system may be withdrawn and
said action shall be without any civil or criminal liability therefor on the part of any
participant, whether guardian, physician, hospital or others. (Footnote 10)We herewith
specifically so hold.
Footnote 10.The declaratory relief we here award is not intended to imply
that the principles enunciated in this case might not be applicable in divers
other types of terminal medical situations such as those described by Drs.
Korein and Diamond, Supra, not necessarily involving the hopeless loss of
cognitive or sapient life.

Our legal expert's structural interpretation of this declaratory order and its
qualifying footnote, has been transformed into Clear Normalized Form. This
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version of the interpretation, which is set forth in Appendix B, is automatically
generated when an appropriate input file is used with the NORMALIZER
software. NORMALIZER also generates the Quinlan Clear Mnemonic Arrow
Diagram and the Clear Mnemonic Outline. The Prolog code for the QUINLAN
LES is generated by AUTOPRO from the same input file. The Clear Mnemonic
Arrow Diagram, the Clear Mnemonic Outline, and the input file for the two
computer programs are also included in Appendix B.
In the hypothetical situation described in Section 2, when the prosecutor
consults the QUINLAN LES or its corresponding normalized version, she will
find drastically different results with respect to the criminal and civil liability
of the physicians for disconnecting the respirator. The record of her consultation
with QUINLAN LES is also included in Appendix B.

V. Synthesis of Related Expert Systems
The contradictory results inferred by the NJ2C-11 LES and the QUINLAN LES
in the exact same hypothetical situation points up the need for some corrective
action with respect to one or both of these systems. Is one of the systems "L*yong"
or "incomplete" in some sense? Are the sets of legal rules that now define these
two expert systems somehow related in the New Jersey legal system in a way
that is not now embodied in the two separate expert systems? Asking these
questions about the NJ2C-11 LES helps clarify the limitations of this expert
system in its present form and its scope of coverage. The NJ2C-11 LES described
in Section 2 deals only with selected parts of the express provisions of Title
2C, Chapter 11of the New Jersey statutes. It does not even include other conditions that are explicitly expressed elsewhere in the New Jersey statutes" let
alone other qualifications expressed or implied in other parts of the New Jersey
or federal legal systems. The ruling in In re Quinfan is one such qualification
- both (1)a delineation of the powers of guardians of permanently unconscious
patients under the New Jersey Probate Code, and (2) an interpretation of the
unwritten constitutional right of privacy found by the United States Supreme
Court in Griswofd u. Connecticut (381U.S. 479,484,83 S.Ct. 1678, 1681,14
L.Ed.2d 510,514 (1965))to exist in the penumbra of specific guarantees of the
Bill of Rights "formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give them
life and substance." Chief Justice Hughes in the Quinfan case declared for a
unanimous New Jersey Supreme Court:

E.g., (a) the general principles of liability in Title ZC,Chapter 2 (including, but not limited to,
requirementsfor a voluntary act, culpability, and a sufficient causal relationship between conduct
and result, and also including defenses for ignorance or mistake, intoxication, duress, consent, or
entrapment); (b) the general principles of justification in Title ZC, Chapter 3 (including, but not
limited to necessity, execution of public duty, and the use of force in self protection, for the protection
of other persons, in defense of premises or personal property, in law enforcement, or by persons
with special responsibility for care, discipline or safety of others); and (c) the requirements for
responsibility in Title ZC, Chapter 4.
l2
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Presumably this right [of privacy] is broad enough to encompass a patient's decision
to decline medical treatment: under certain circumstances, in much the same way as
it is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision to terminate pregnancy under certain
conditions. (Roe u. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153, 93 S.Ct. 705, 727, 35 L.Ed.2d 147, 177
(1973))

One approach for resolving incompatibility between two o r more legal expert
systems such as that described above for the NJ2C-11 LES and the QUINLAN
LES is to integrate them into a combined system that eliminates the incompatibility. Building such a combined system requires the same sort of legal expertise
needed for writing a legal treatise on the subject. It requires that additional rules
be formulated that relate the rules of the separate systems. In the case of these
two expert systems such additional rules must be editorially extracted from what
is stated in the Quinlan opinion and related to the rules expressed in the NJ2C
LES and the QUINLAN LES in a way that eliminates the incompatibility.
Another approach would be to synthesize multiple systems that are related
by furnishing guides that help assure use of the multiple systems in a coordinated
way that will enable a careful user to avoid the incompatibility. When a user
is consulting a LES that is related to another LES, at the occurrence of the exact
word or phrase that is the juncture where the two legal expert systems are related,
the user can be alerted to the existence of the related LES and given an opportunity to consult it before responding to the question being posed by the first
LES. Other forms of assistance can also be made available at this same point
to assist in avoiding what seems to be an incompatibility. This second approach
is the one explored here and illustrated in Appendix C.
In the Quinlan case the New Jersey Supreme Court was dealing with the
possible application of N.J.S.A. 2A:113-1, a statute defining murder that has
since been replaced by Chapter 11.That statute explicitly required that the killing
be an unlawful one (see N.J.S.A. 2A:113-1). In the Quinlan case the New Jersey
Supreme Court declared:
. . .We conclude that there would be no criminal homicide in the circumstances of this
case. We believe, first, that the ensuing death would not be homicide but the expiration
from existing natural causes. Secondly, even if it were to be regarded as homicide, it
would not be unlawful.
These conclusions rest upon definitional and constitutional bases. The termination
of treatment pursuant to the right of privacy is, within the limitations of this case, ips0
fucto lawful. Thus, a death resulting from such an act would not come within the scope
of homicide statutes proscribing only the unlawful killing of another. There is a real
and in this case determinative distinction between the unlawful taking of the life of another
and the ending of artificial life-support systems as a matter of self-determination. (Quinlan
case 1976, 51)

By its enactment of the Code of Criminal Justice in 1979 the New Jersey
legislature removed the requirement of unlawfulness from the definition of
criminal homicide. Thus, the basis for the second part of the court's holding
- namely, that even if the actions in the Quinlan case were homicide, they did not
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amount to criminal homicide because they were not unlawful - has been
rendered moot by legislative repea1 of the statute. This legislative change has
not, however, affected the first part of the court's holding - that the subsequent
death would not be homicide but expiration from existing natural causes - as
the basis for linkage to the criminal homicide provisions of Chapter 11.Hence,
the Quinlan case should be operationally linked to the person-causes condition
expressed in subsection 1A of the normalized representation of the NJ2C-11
LES as an elaboration or explanation of the meaning of "a person purposely,
knowingly, recklessly, or, by driving a vehicle recklessly, CAUSES the death
of another human being" in the coordinated legal expert systems. (See the
normalized version of Chapter 11 in Appendix A.)
From a user's point of view the coordinated legal expert systems would operate
in the following manner. When the question about causing death is presented,
along with the user's alternative choices, the user would be alerted to select the
"Definition" alternative by the highlighted word "CAUSES" in the question.
(The
in the highlighted term "CAUSES" indicates that there is at least one
legal expert system available that deals with how this term is to be interpreted
for purposes of answering the question.)
'I*"

person-causes
In the situation that you are analyzing is it the case that
a person purposely, knowingly, recklessly, or, by driving a

vehicle recklessly, CAUSES' the death of another human being?

Choose
Yes

No
Unknown
Help
Definition
Pause
stop

Upon selecting the "Definition" alternative and getting the definition for CAUSES
the user is provided with text that discusses various situations in which conduct
does result in death of another human being and various situations in which
conduct does not result in such death. Included among the situations where
conduct is deemed not to cause death is a description of the Quinlan case as
one involving comatose patients and discontinuance of treatment by physicians.
Here, users are advised that if they think that their situation is sufficiently like
Quinlan, they should respond to the person-causes question with "No," and
users that think that their situation might be like Quinlan are advised to select
"Pause" and either to consult normalized versions of our expert's interpretation of the Quinlan order for declaratory relief or to consult the QUINLAN
LES. When users consult either, they will access the interpretation of the expert
whose expertise is embodied there.
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With the coordination of the use of the two legal expert systems in this manner,
a user has the option of answering the person-causes question "Yes" or "No"
without ever consulting the QUINLAN LES or the normalized versions of the
Quinlan rules, or alternatively, the user can make choices that will delay the
selection of one of those answers until after an examination of the normalized
rules or consultation with the QUINLAN LES occurs.
The exercise of coordinating and structuring the use of related legal expert
systems as a way of synthesizing related legal rules from statutory and case
(and even constitutional) sources has some important lessons for all who are
interested in the potentialities and limitations of such systems. The coordination of the NJ2C-11 LES and the QUINLAN LES illustrates one way that
legislative statutes and court case decisions can be synthesized, and it is a useful
step forward in that respect.
O n the other hand, this example is a sober reminder of the magnitude of the
task of constructing legal expert systems that will be practically useful to legal
practitioners and researchers. Imagine the enormity of what confronts a LES
builder seeking to build an expert system on murder in New Jersey before the
Quinfan case occurred. Would such a builder have the incentive, inclination,
resources, or knowledge to be led to speculating about whether unwritten federal
constitutional rights of personal privacy of individuals to noninterference from
the state in the purchase and use of contraceptives and to the termination of
pregnancy is likely to be interpreted to encompass noninterference from the
state in a patient's choice to decline treatment? Such a LES builder would have
to be concerned about all the many possible exceptions to the general rules about
murder. The task would not be the focused one faced by the attorney for the
Quinlan family, nor would the motivation or resources to research and construct
a persuasive argument for an exception springing from an interpretation of
privacy rights be the same. What makes building a LES that embodies rules
about future court decisions overwhelming, is the unavailability of a clear crystal
ball that will unerringly predict future human behavior - in particular, the
decisions that judges will make in disputes that come before them and statutes
that legislatures will enact on matters of social policy.
Even when a builder is confident about what a court is likely to decide in
the future, there is still open the question of how widely its effects are likely
to be. For example, if the United States Supreme Court were to undercut the
position it took in Roe u. Wade on a woman's privacy right to noninterference
from the state in having an abortion, to what extent, if at all, would that affect
the privacy rights of patients to noninterference by the state in their exercise
of choices to not receive treatment from physicians?
It is a much different and far easier matter to build expert systems based on
court decisions that have already been made, rather than upon what courts are
likely to do in future disputes. For now, attention of LES buildings on rules
articulated in past decisions is likely to be more fruitful than speculations about
possible rules for probable future decisions, even though users' concerns are
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chiefly with what is likely to happen in the future. Those concerns are perhaps
best addressed by achieving a deep, precise, and complete understanding of what
has been happening with respect to such decisions in the recent past.

VI. Conclusion
In their work lawyers need to be informed about legal rules from constitutions,
statutes, court opinions, regulations, administrative rulings, and other sources.
By extensive indexing and other reference aids, manual methods with books
provide legal researchers with cues for finding rules that are possibly relevant
to their current problems. Virtually always, not all of the rules and other useful
information is to be found in a single volume. However, the contents of different
volumes in the legal literature are related by an elaborate connective structure
that enables a lawyer to move deftly among large numbers of different sources
to extract the most relevant information. It seems likely that legal expert systems
will similarly need to take into account legal rules from a wide variety of sources
and will be unable to embody all of them in a single LES. Connective structure
between one LES and others will need to be developed that will help guide a
user from where she starts to each other LES that is available and relevant for
dealing with the problem at hand. The inadequacy of separate isolated expert
systems is apparent in the example of the ones described here for the Quinlan
case and the New Jersey criminal homicide statute. One means of dealing with
their incompatibility as isolated systems is to provide connective structure that
relates them in a way that the systems can be used in a coordinated manner
that reduces the likelihood of getting results that seem to be incompatible. One
example of such structure has been illustrated here; we expect that many others
will be invented, considerably more clever than this initial effort, as developers
of legal expert systems become aware of the problem of providing connective
structure and turn their attentions to dealing with it. Nothing has been said
here about the 180 alternative structural interpretations of the order for
declarative relief issued in the Quinlan case, each of them different and each
of them leading to a different LES. These 180 different legal expert systems
also need to be related to each other and other legal expert systems in a way
that will get to the attention of legal researchers dealing with problems that
involve them, . . .but that, and similar alternative interpretations of the New
Jersey criminal homicide statute, is a story for another paper.
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Appendix A. NJ 2C-11 Legal Expert System
1. Parts of Chapter 11 of the New Jersey Code of Criminal Justice

2C :11-1 Definitions
In Chapter 11 through 15, unless a different meaning plainly is required:
a. "Bodily injury" means physical pain, illness or any impairment of physical conditions;
b. "Serious bodily injury" means bodily injury which creates a substantial risk of death
or which causes serious, permanent disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment
of the function of any bodily member or organ;
c. "Deadly weapon" means any firearm or other weapon, device, instrument, material
or substance, whether animate or inanimate, which in the manner it is used or is
intended to be used, is known to be capable of producing death or serious bodily
injury or which in the manner it is fashioned would lead the victim reasonably to
believe it to be capable of producing death or serious bodily injury.
2-C:11-2. Criminal homicide
a. A person is guilty of criminal homicide if he purposely, knowingly, recklessly, or,
under the circumstances set forth in section 2c:ll-5, causes the death of another
human being.
b. Criminal homicide is murder, manslaughter or death by auto. . . .[The rest of 11-2b
and 11-2.1 have been omitted here.]
2C:ll-3. Murder
a. Except as provided in section 2C:ll-4 criminal homicide constitutes murder when:
(1)The actor purposely causes death or serious bodily injury resulting in death; or
(2) The actor knowingly causes death or serious bodily injury resulting in death; or
(3) It is committed when the actor, acting either alone or with one or more other
persons, is engaged in the commission of, or an attempt to commit, or flight after
committing or attempting to commit robbery, sexual assault, arson, burglary,
kidnapping or criminal escape, and in the course of such crime or of immediate
flight therefrom, any person causes the death of a person other than one of the
participants; except that in any prosecution under this subsection, in which the
defendant was not the only participant in the underlying crime, it is an affirmative
defense that the defendant:
(a) Did not commit the homicidal act or in any way solicit, request, command
importune, cause or aid the commission thereof; and
(b) Was not armed with a deadly weapon, or any instrument, article or substance
readily capable of causing death or serious physical injury and of a sort not
ordinarily carried in public places by law-abiding persons; and
(c) Had no reasonable ground to believe that any other participant was armed
with such a weapon, instrument, article or substance; and
(d) Had no reasonable ground to believe that any other participant intended to
engage in conduct likely to result in death or serious physical injury.
b. Murder is a crime of the first degree. . .
(The rest of subsection b., as well as subsections c., d., e., f., and g., are long and
complex subsections that deal with sentencing and other matters that are peripheral
to our concerns here; they are, therefore, omitted.)
2c:ll-4. Manslaughter
a. Criminal homicide constitutes aggravated manslaughter when the actor recklessly
causes death under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to human life.
b. Criminal homicide constitutes manslaughter when:
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(1)It is committed recklessly; or
(2) A homicide which would otherwise be murder under section 2 C l l - 3 is committed
in the heat of passion resulting from a reasonable provocation.
c. Aggravated manslaughter is a crime of the first degree. Manslaughter is a crime of
the second degree.

2c:ll-5. Death by auto
a. Criminal homicide constitutes death by auto when it is caused by driving a vehicle
recklessly.
b. Death by auto is a crime of the fourth degree.
c. For good cause shown the court may, in accepting a plea of guilty under this section,
order that such plea not be evidential in any civil proceeding.
2 c : l l - 6 . Aiding suicide
A person who purposely aids another to commit suicide is guilty of a crime of the
second degree if his conduct causes such suicide or an attempted suicide, and otherwise
of a crime of the fourth degree.

2. Clear Mnemonic Arrow Diagram of N J 2C-11, Criminal Homicide
(see diagram on facing page)
3. Clear Normalized Form of NJ 2C-11, Criminal Homicide
1 . IF
*
A. a person purposely, knowingly, recklessly, or, by driving a vehicle recklessly,
causes the death of another human being,
THEN
B. the person is guilty of criminal homicide, AND
C. IF
1) the actor purposely causes death or serious bodily injury resulting in death, OR
2 ) the actor knowingly causes death or seriuos bodily injury resulting in death, OR
3) A. the criminal homicide is committed when the actor, acting either alone or
with one or more other persons, is engaged in the commission of, or an
attempt to commit, or flight after committing or attempting to commit
robbery, sexual assault, arson, burglary, kidnapping or criminal escape,
AND
B. in the course of such crime or of immediate flight therefrom, any person
causes the death of a person other than one of the participants, AND
the defendant was the only participant in the underlying crime, OR
the defendant did commit the homicidal act or in some way solicit,
request, command, importune, cause or aid the commission theieof, OR
the defendant was armed with a deadly weapon, or some instrument,
article or substance readily capable of causing death or serious physical
injury and of a sort not ordinarily carried in public places by law-abiding
persons, OR
the defendant had reasonable ground to believe that some other participant was armed with such a weapon, instrument, article or substance,

OR
the defendant had reasonable ground to believe that some other participant intended to engage in conduct likely to result in death or serious
physical injury,

-->--aids-suicide
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THEN
4)

IF

A. the homicide is committed in the heat of passion resulting from a reasonable
provocation,
THEN
B. the criminal homicide constitutes manslaughter, AND
C. manslaughter is a crime of the second degree,
BUT OTHERWISE,
D. the criminal homicide constitutes murder,
BUT OTHERWISE,
5) IT IS NOT SO THAT
the criminal homicide constitutes murder, AND
D. IF
1. the criminal homicide is committed recklessly,
THEN
2. IF
A. the actor recklessly causes death under circumstances manifesting extreme
indifference to human life,
THEN
8. the criminal homicide constitutes aggravated manslaughter, AND
C. aggravated manslaughter is a crime of the first degree,
BUT OTHERWISE,
D. IF
1. the criminal homicide is caused by driving a vehicle recklessly,
THEN
2. the criminal homicide constitutes death by auto, AND
3. death by auto is a crime of the fourth degree, AND
4. for good cause shown the court may, in accepting a plea of guilty under
this subsection, order that such plea not be evidential in any civil
proceeding,
BUT OTHERWISE,
5. the criminal homicide constitutes manslaughter,
BUT OTHERWISE,
E. IT IS NOT SO THAT
the person is guilty of criminal homicide, AND
2 IF

A. a person purposely aids another to commit suicide,
THEN
B. IF
1. that person‘s conduct causes such suicide or an attempted suicide,
THEN
2. that person is guilty of a crime of the second degree,
BUT OTHERWISE,
3. that person is guilty of a crime of the fourth degree.
The * indicates a statement that has been interpreted and for which at least one legal
expert system has been built that embodies that interpretation (or a statement that contain
words or phrases that have been interpreted and for which such a LES has been built).
You can access the LES that is about the interpretation by:
1. running the Primary LES to which the Interpretive LES is related, and
2 . selecting the “Help” option when the first question is presented, and
3. pressing the <F10> key, and
4. selecting the Interpreted Term from the index, and
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5 . choosing which situation seems most like the situation that you are analyzing
to access the most appropriate LES.
PRIMARY LEGAL EXPERT SYSTEM
INTERPRETED TERM
def-causes
NJ2C-11
4. Input File to Generate Arrow Diagrams and

Normalized Versions with NORMALIZER and to
Generate the Legal Expert System with AUTOPRO
NEW JERSEY CODE OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE
2C:ll-3. Murder
Interpretation of Professor Layman E. Allen
(person-causes
crimnlhomicide
&
((purposely-causes 1 knowingly-causes 1
(engagedin-crime & causes-death &
(only-participant 1 commit-the-act
1 was-armed 1
believ-othr-armed
I bliev-othrintnd)))
> (heat-of-passion
> manslaughter & m-second-degree
BO is-murder)
BO
is-murder)
&
(cmmit-recklessly
> (extjndifference
> agg-manslaughter & a d i r s t d e g r e e
BO (driving-rcklssly
> deathby-auto & d b d o u r t k d g r e e & court-may-order
BO manslaughter)))
BO
crimnhomicide)
&
(aids-suicide
> (causes-attempt
> guilty-2-degree
BO guilty-Ldegree))
Chapter 11 of the New Jersey Code of Criminal Justice

>

-

-

2C:ll-2. Criminal homicide
MNEMONIC DETAILED MARKED VERSION
(crimnLhomicide: the person is guilty of criminal homicide)
[ person-causes: a person purposely, knowingly, recklessly, or, by driving a vehicle
recklessly, causes the death of another human being]

2C:ll-3. Murder
MNEMONIC DETAILED MARKED VERSION
[is-murder: <the> criminal homicide constitutes murder]
[purposely-causes: the actor purposely causes death or serious bodily injury resulting
in death]
[knowingly-causes: the actor knowingly causes death or serious bodily injury resulting
in death]
[ engagebn-crime: the criminal homicide is committed when the actor, acting either
alone or with one or more other persons, is engaged in the commission of, or an attempt
to commit, or flight after committing or attempting to commit robbery, sexual assault,
arson, burglary, kidnapping or criminal escape]
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[causes-death: in the course of such crime or of immediate flight therefrom, any person
causes the death of a person other than one of the participants]
[ only-participant:

the defendant was the only participant in the underlying crime]

[commit-the-act:
the defendant did commit the homicidal act or in some way solicit,
request, command, importune, cause or aid the commission thereof]
[was-armed: the defandant was armed with a deadly weapon, or some instrument,
article or substance readily capable of causing death or serious physical injury and of
a sort not ordinarily carried in public places by law-abiding persons]
[bliev-othr-armed:
the defendant had reasonable ground to believe that some other
participant was armed with such a weapon, instrument, article or substance]
[ bliev-othrintnd: the defendant had reasonable ground to believe that some other participant intended to engage in conduct likely to result in death or serious physical injury]

[heat-of-passion:
[a)<the> homicide (which would otherwise be murder under section
2C:ll-3] is committed in the heat of passion resulting from a reasonable provocation].

2C:ll-4. Manslaughter
MNEMONIC DETAILED MARKED VERSION
[ a g e a n s l a u g h t e r : the criminal homicide constitutes aggravated manslaughter]
[extjndifference: the actor recklessly causes death under circumstances manifesting
extreme indifference to human life]
[manslaughter: the criminal homicide constitutes manslaughter]
[ cmmit-recklessly: [It)<the criminal homicide is committed recklessly]; or
[heat-of-passion:
the homicide is committed in the heat of passion resulting from a
reasonable provocation].
[ a d i r s t d e g r e e : aggravated manslaughter is a crime of the first degree]
[ L s e c o n h d e g r e e : manslaughter is a crime of the second degree].

2C:ll-5. Death by auto

MNEMONIC DETAILED MAR!<ED VERSION
[deatkby-auto:

the criminal homicide constitutes death by auto]

[ driving-rcklssly: the criminal homicide is caused by driving a vehicle recklessly]

[ d b a f o u r t h d g r e e : death by auto is a crime of the fourth degree]
[court-may-order: for good cause shown the court may, in accepting a plea of guilty
under this subsection, order that such plea not be evidential in any civil proceeding]

2C:ll-6. Aiding suicide
MNEMONIC DETAILED MARKED VERSION
[aids-suicide:

a person [who] purposely aids another to commit suicide]

[guiltyL-degree:

<that person> is guilty of a crime of the,second degree] if

[ causes-attempt: (hisj<that person's> conduct causes such suicide or an attempted
suicide], and otherwise

[guilty-Ldegree:

<that person is guilty> of a crime of the fourth degree].
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5. Sample Run of NJ 2C-71 Legal Expert System13
EXPERT SYSTEMS GENERATED FROM STRUCTURAL INTERPRETATIONS OF LEGAL RULES

NEW JERSEY CODE OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE
2C:ll-3. Murder.
Interpretation of Professor Layman E. Allen
person-causes?
In the situation you are analyzing is it the case that a person purposely, knowingly,
recklessly, or, by driving a vehicle recklessly, causes the death of another human being? y
INFERRED RESULT
crimnUomicide
the person is guilty of criminal homicide
purposely-causes?
In the situation that you are analyzing is it the case that the actor purposely causes death
or serious bodily injury resulting in death? y
heat-ofpassion?
In the situation that you are analyzing is it the case that the homicide is committed in
the heat of passion resulting from a reasonable provocation? n
INFERRED RESULT
isxurder
the criminal homicide constitutes murder
knowing1y-causes?
In the situation that you are analyzing is it the case that the actor knowingly causes
death or serious bodily injury resulting in death? y
INFERRED RESULT
is-murder
the criminal homicide constitutes murder
engagedin-crime?
In the situation that you are analyzing is it the case that the criminal homicide is committed
when the actor, acting either alone or with one or more other persons, is engaged in
the commission of, or an attempt t o commit, or flight after committing or attempting
to commit robbery, sexual assault, arson, burglary, kidnapping or criminal escape? n
l3

This legal expert system was produced by the AUTOPROLOG program developed by Layman

E. Allen and Charles S. Saxon with the aid of a research grant from theNational Center for Automated
Information Research (NCAIR). Copyright 0 1989, Layman E. Allen, Charles S. Saxon,and NCAIR.
The AUTOPRO System has been developed to demonstrate the potential of expert systems as a tool
to assist law teachers and other legal professionals. It is important that users of expert systems produced by AUTOPRO understand that the legal expertise they contain has been furnished by. the legal
experts who developed those systems. It is the intention of the authors of AUTOPRO (1)that it be
used only by qualified legal experts to produce legal expert systems embodying their expertise, and
(2) that the systems they produce be used only by law students, attorneys, and other appropriately
qualified persons. No report, reasons, or conclusions produced by AUTOPRO-generated expert
systems should be relied upon by any users as authoritative without consulting an attorney competent
toevaluate the legal effects of the information furnished. Trace of run done on July 3 1989 at 0:11:56.
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cmmitrecklessl y?

In the situation that you are analyzing is it the case that the criminal homicide is committed
recklessly? n
aids-suicide?
In the situation that you are analyzing is it the case that a person purposely aids another
to commit suicide? n
Based on the Interpretation of Professor Laymen E. Allen of this provision and your
responses given below to the questions asked:
QUESTIONS
person-causes
purposely-causes
heat-of-passion
knowingly-causes
engagedin-crime
cmmit-recklessly
aidssuicide

RESPONSES
?
?
?
?
?

7
1

Y
Y
n
Y
n
n
n

the following results can be inferred for the reasons given:
THE RESULT crimnlLhomicide
CAN BE INFERRED FOR THE FOLLOWING REASON(S):
person-causes.
THE RESULT the person is guilty of criminal homicide
CAN BE INFERRED FOR THE FOLLOWING REASON(S):
a person purposely, knowingly, recklessly, or, by driving a vehicle recklessly, causes
the death of another human being.
THE RESULT is-murder
CAN BE INFERRED FOR THE FOLLOWING REASON(S):
person-causes,
purposely-causes, and
NOT heat-of-passion.
THE RESULT the criminal homicide constitutes murder
CAN BE INFERRED FOR THE FOLLOWING REASON(S):
a person purposely, knowingly, recklessly, or, by driving a vehicle recklessly, causes
the death of another human being,
the actor purposely causes death or serious bodily in jury resulting in death, and
IT IS NOT SO THAT the homicide is committed in the heat of passion resulting
from a reasonable provocation.
THE RESULT is murder
CAN BE INFERRED FOR THE FOLLOWING REASON(S):
person-causes,
knowingly-causes, and
NOT heat-of-passion.
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THE RESULT the criminal homicide constitutes murder

CAN BE INFERRED FOR THE FOLLOWING REASON(S):
a person purposely, knowingly, recklessly, or, by driving a vehicle recklessly, causes
the death of another human being,
the actor knowingly causes death or serious bodily injury resulting in death, and
IT IS NOT SO THAT the homicide is committed in the heat of passion resulting
from a reasonable provocation.
On the basis of the same interpretation and the same responses none of the following
results can be inferred:

RESULT(S) THAT CANNOT BE INFERRED
manslaughter
mseconhdegree
guiltyd-degree
guilt y-Ldegree
agg-manslaughter
dirst-degree
deathby-au to
dbdourthdgree
court-may-order
NOT crimnlhomicide
NOT is-murder

Appendix B. QUINLAN Legal Expert System
1. Clear Normalized Form of Quinlan Order for Declaratory Relief

IF
1. the responsible attending physicians conclude that there is no reasonable possibility
of the patient's ever emerging from his or her present comatose condition to a cognitive,
sapient state, AND
2. they conclude that the life-support apparatus now being administered to the patient
should be discontinued,

THEN
3. IF
A. the guardian and family of the patient concur that such there is n o such reasonable
possibility of emergence and that such life-support apparatus be discontinued,

THEN
B. the physicians have the LEGAL POWER to consult with the hospital 'Ethics Committee' or like body of the institution in which the patient is then hospitalized, AND
C. they MUST consult with that committee or body,
BUT OTHERWISE
D. they do not have the LEGAL POWER to consult with that committee or body, AND
E. they NEED NOT consult with that committee or body, AND
4. IF
A. they consult with that committee or body, AND
B. that consultative body agrees that there is no reasonable possibility of the patient's
ever emerging from his or her present comatose condition to a cognitive, sapient state,
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THEN
C. the present life-support system MAY be withdrawn, AND
D. said action MUST be without any civil or criminal liability therefor on the part
of any participant, whether guardian, physician, hospital or others,
BUT OTHERWISE,
E. the present life-support system NEED NOT be withdrawn, AND
F. said action NEED NOT be without any civil or criminal liability therefor on the
part of any participant, whether guardian, physician, hospital or others,
BUT OTHERWISE,
5 . they do not have the LEGAL POWER to consult with that committee or body, AND
6. they MUST NOT consult with that committee or body.
2 . Clear Mnemonic Arrow Diagram of Quinlan Order for Declaratory Relief
b- no-emerging

- apparatus-discon

concr-disc-prgns

+
0

r

power-to-consult
shall-consult

Lc

no pwr to-cnsit
need-nit-consult
do-consult - cons-body-agrees -4 rnay:be:withdrawn
o
no-liability

I

b
‘-D

need-not-wiihdrw
may-be-liability

no pwr-to-cnsit

C rnUSt-not-consuIt

3. Input File to Generate Arrow Diagrams and Normalized Versions

with NORMALIZER and to Generate the QUINLAN LES with AUTOPRO
IN RE QUINLAN - ORDER FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF.
Interpretation of Professor Sallyanne Payton

>

no-emerging&apparatus-discon
(concr-disc-prgns
> power-to-consult&shalLconsult
BO no-pwr-to-cnslt&neeb_not-consult)

(do-consult&cons-body-agrees
may-be-withdrawn&no_liability
BO neehnot-withdnv&may-be_liability)
BO no-pwr-to-cnslt&must__not-consult
&

>

Matter of Quinlan Order for Declaratory Relief
MNEMONIC DETAILED MARKED VERSION
LIST OF CONSTITUENT SENTENCES
[ family-concur:

-

the guardian and family of the patient concur],

[ no-emerging: the responsible attending physicians conclude that there is no reasonable
possibility of the patient’s ever emerging from his or her present comatose condition
to a cognitive, sapient state]
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[apparatus-discon: the responsible attending physicians conclude that the life-support
apparatus now being administered to the patient should be discontinued],
[ shaILconsult: the responsible attending physicians MUST consult with that committee
or body]

[do-consult:
body 1

the responsible attending physicians did consult with that committee or

[concr-to-consult:
the guardian and family of the patient concur that such consultation be undertaken],
[ concr-discntinue: the guardian and family of the patient concur that such life-support
apparatus be discontinued],

(concr-cnslt-disc:
the guardian and family of the patient concur that such life-support
apparatus be discontinued and that such consultation be undertaken],
Iconcr-disc-prgns:
the guardian and family of the patient concur that such there is
no such reasonable possibility of emergence and that such life-support apparatus be
discontinued],
[concur-alL3: the guardian and family of the patient concur that such there is no such
reasonable possibility of emergence, that such life-support apparatus be discontinued,
and that such consultation be undertaken]
[ cons-body-agrees:
the hospital ‘Ethics Committee’ or like body of the institution agrees
that there is no reasonable possibility of the patient’s ever emerging from his or her present
comatose condition to a cognitive, sapient state],

[may-be-withdrawn:

the present life-support system MAY be withdrawn] and

[mustnot-withdraw:
and

the present life-support system MUST NOT be withdrawn]

[no-liability: said action MUST be without any civil or criminal liability therefor on
the part of any participant, whether guardian, physician, hospital or others].
[ mustnot-consult:
the responsible attending physicians MUST NOT consult with the
hospital ’Ethics Committee’. or like body of the institution]
[ neednot-consult: the responsible attending physicians NEED NOT consult with the
hospital ’Ethics Committee’ or like body of the institution with that committee or
body 1
[need-not-withdrw:
the present life-support system NEED NOT be withdrawn]

[may-be-liability: said action NEED NOT be without any civil or criminal liability
therefor on the part of any participant, whether guardian, physician, hospital or
others].
[power-to-consult:
the responsible attending physicians have the LEGAL POWER
to consult with the hospital ‘Ethics Committee’ or like body of the institution in which
the patient is then hospitalized].
[no-pwr-to-cnslt:

the responsible attending physicians d o not have the LEGAL

POWER to with the hospital ’Ethics Committee‘ or like body of the institution with that
committee or body]
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4 . Sample run of

QUINLAN Legal Expert System"

EXPERT SYSTEMS GENERATED FROM STRUCTURAL INTERPRETATIONS OF LEGAL RULES

I N RE QUINLAN - ORDER FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF
Interpretation of Professor Sallyanne Payton
no-emerging?
In the situation that you are analyzing is it the case that the responsible attending
physicians conclude that there is no reasonable possibility of the patient's ever emerging
from his or her present comatose condition to a cognitive, sapient state? y
apparatus-discon?
In the situation that you are analyzing is it the case that the responsible attending
physicians conclude that the life-support apparatus now being administered to the patient
should be discontinued? y
concr-disc-prgns?
In the situation that you are analyzing is it the case that the guardian and family of
the patient concur that such there is no such reasonable possibility of emergence and
that such life-support apparatus be discontinued? y

INFERRED RESULT
power-to-consul
t
the responsible attending physicians have the LEGAL POWER to consult with the hospital
"Ethics Committee" or like body of the institution in which the patient is then hospitalized

INFERRED RESULT
shall-consul t
the responsible attending physicians MUST consult with that committee or body
do-consult?
In the situation that you are analyzing is it the case that the responsible attending
physicians did consult with that committee or body? y
cons-bod y-agrees?
In the situation that you are analyzing is it the case that the hospital "Ethics Committee"
or like body of the institution agrees that there is no reasonable possibility of the patient's
ever emerging from his or her present comatose condition to a cognitive, sapient state? y

INFERRED RESULT
.

may-be-withdrawn
the present life-support system MAY be withdrawn

INFERRED RESULT
noJiability
said action must be without any civil or criminal liability therefor on the part of any
participant, whether guardian, physician, hospital or others.
l4

Trace of run done on July 3 1989 at 0:11:56.On this legal expert system, see footnote 13, supra

p. 305.
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Based on the Interpretation of Professor Sallyanne Payton of this provision and your
responses given below to the questions asked:

QUESTIONS

RESPONSES

no-emerging 7
apparatus-discon ?
concr-disc-prgns
?
do-consult 7
cons-body-agrees
7
the following results can be inferred for the reasons

Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
given:

THE RESULT power-to-consult

CAN BE INFERRED FOR THE FOLLOWING REASON(S):
no-emerging,
apparatus-discon,
concr-disc-prgns.

AND

THE RESULT the responsible attending physicians have the LEGAL POWER to consult with the
hospital "Ethics Committee" or like body of the institution in which the patient is then
hospitalized

CAN BE INFERRED FOR THE FOLLOWING REASON(S):
the responsible attending physicians conclude that there is no reasonable possibility
of the patient's ever emerging from his or her present comatose condition to a cognitive,
sapient state,
the responsible attending physicians conclude that the life-support apparatus now
being administered to the patient should be discontinued, AND
the guardian and family of the patient concur that such there is no such reasonable
possibility of emergence and that such life-support apparatus be discontinued.

THE RESULT shall consult

CAN BE INFERRED FOR THE FOLLOWING REASON(S):
no-emerging,
apparatus-discon,
concr-disc-prgns.

AND

THE RESULT the responsible attending physicians MUST consult with that committee or body
CAN BE INFERRED FOR THE FOLLOWING REASON(S):
the responsible attending physicians conclude that there is no reasonable possibility
of the patient's ever emerging from his or her present comatose condition to a cognitive,
sapient state,
the responsible attending physicians conclude that the life-support apparatus now
being administered to the patient should be discontinued, AND
the guardian and family of the patient concur that such there is no such reasonable
possibility of emergence and that such life-support apparatus be discontinued.

THE RESULT may-be-withdrawn
CAN BE INFERRED FOR THE FOLLOWING REASON(S):
no-emerging,
apparatus-discon,
do-consult, AND
cons-body-agrees.
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THE RESULT the present lifesupport system MAY be withdrawn
CAN BE INFERRED FOR THE FOLLOWING REASON(S):
the responsible attending physicians conclude that there is no reasonable possibility
of the patient’s ever emerging from his or her present comatose condition to a cognitive,
sapient state,
the responsible attending physicians conclude that the life-support apparatus now
being administered to the patient should be discontinued,
the responsible attending physicians did consult with that committee or body, AND
the hospital “Ethics Committee” or like body of the institution agrees that there
is no reasonable possibility of the patient’s ever emerging from his or her present comatose
condition to a cognitive, sapient state.

THE RESULTno-liability

CAN RE INFERRED FOR THE FOLLOWING REASON(S):
no-emerging,
apparatus-discon,
do-consult, AND
cons-body-agrees.

THE RESULT said action MUST be without any civil or criminal liability therefor on the part
of any participant, whether guardian, physician, hospital or others

CAN BE INFERRED FOR THE FOLLOWING REASON(S):
the responsible attending physicians conclude that there is no reasonable possibility
of the patient’s ever emerging from his or her present comatose condition to a cognitive,
sapient state,
the responsible attending physicians conclude that the life-support apparatus now
being administered to the patient should be discontinued,
the responsible attending physicians did consult with that committee or body, AND
the hospital “Ethics Committee” or like body of the institution agrees that there
is no reasonable possibility of the patient’s ever emerging from his or her present comatose
condition to a cognitive, sapient state.
On the basis of the same interpretation and the same responses none of the following
results can be inferred:

RESULT(S) THAT CANNOT BE INFERRED
n o-pwr-t
o-cnsl t
need_not-consul t
neebot-withdnv
may-beliabili ty
must-not-consul t
Appendix C. The Synthesis of the NJZC-11 LES with the QUINLAN LES
EXPERT SYSTEMS GENERATED FROM STRUCTURAL INTERPRETATIONS OF LEGAL RULESI5

NEW JERSEY CODE OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE.
2C:11-3. Murder.
Interpretation of Professor Layman E. Allen
Trace of run done on July 3 1989 at 18:22:5.On this legal expert system, see footnote 13, supra
p. 305.
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person-causes?
In the situation that you are analyzing is it the case that a person purposely, knowingly,
recklessly, or, by driving a vehicle recklessly, CAUSES the death of another human being?
Select
Yes
No
Unknown
Help
Definition
Pause
stop
When the user selected the "Definitions" option, the following appeared on the screen:
Press the <Esc> to return
In the situation that you are analyzing is it the case that a person purposely,
knowingly, recklessly, or, by driving a vehicle recklessly, CAUSES* the death
of another human being?

Select the word of phrase that you want defined by pressing the <Right Arrow>
key, and when the correct word or phrase is highlighted, press the <Return> key.
When the user selected the highlighted "CAUSES*," the following appeared on the
screen:
Interpretation of "causes" in court opinions
(Index Name: def-causes)

IF

you think that your situation is definitely like any of the situations below in which
the conduct was deemed not to have caused the death of the decedent,
THEN you should choose the "No" alternative, BUT

IF
you think that your situation might be deemed to be like one of them,
THEN you should move the cursor to the section that describes that situation and press
the <FIO> key to explore it further.
..........................................................................
SITUATIONS 1-3
. . . (other situations not presented here)
..........................................................................
SITUATION 4
Under certain circumstances, even if a comatose patient's death would be accelerated
by withdrawal of life sustaining apparatus, the ensuing death is deemed not to
be caused by the withdrawal but by existing natural causes.
Matter of Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, 79 A.L.R.3d 205 (1976) certiorari denied
997 S.Ct. 319, 429 U.S. 922, 50 L.Ed.2d 289.

1F

you want to explore the similarity between your situation and this one in greater
detail,
THEN press the <Esc> key and then the <P> key, and then either
(1) to access normalized representations of an expert's interpretation of the
Quinlan case, enter at the system prompt:
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SHOW-CAUSE-04.
INT
or
(2) to access the QUINLAN LES, enter at the system prompt:
QUINLAN
........................................................................
SITUATIONS 5-9
. . . (other situations not presented here)
................................................................

IF

you think that your situation is definitely like any of the situations above in which
the conduct was deemed not to have caused the death of the decedent,
THEN you should choose the "No" alternative, BUT

IF
you think that your situation might be deemed to be like one of them,
THEN you should move the cursor to the section that describes that situation and press
the <F10> key to explore it further.
When the user chose to explore SITUATION 4 further by accessing the normalized
representations of the Quinlan case, the following appeared on the screen:
After you finish examining the contents of this file by scrolling through it and
then press the < E x > key to end the session with this file, you can
1)access the QUINLAN LES, by entering at the system prompt:
QUINLAN
or
2) return to the NJ2C-11 LES, by entering at the system prompt:
NJZC-I1
or
3) otherwise continue your research before returning to NJZC-11.

NEW JERSEY CODE OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE
ZC:l1-(1-5). CriminalHomicide, Murder, Manslaughter, Death by Auto.
Interpretation of Professor Layman E. Allen.
CONTENTS

- To "scroll", use PgDn, PgUp, ArrowDown, Arrow Up,

-, and

-

Allen Interpretation: Clear Arrow Diagrams, Outline, and Normalized Version
Clear Short Arrow Diagram of Allen Interpretation
Clear Mnemonic Arrow Diagram of Allen Interpretation
Clear Mnemonic Outline of Allen Interpretation
Clear Normalized Version of Allen Interpretation
Present Versions of New Jersey Code of Criminal Justice Provisions that deal
with various forms of Criminal-Homicide2C:ll-1. Definitions
2c:ll-3. CriminalLhomicide2C:ll-3. Murder
2C:ll-4. Manslaughter
2c:ll-5. Death by auto
CLEAR MENEMONIC ARROW DIAGRAM OF QUINLAN ORDER
FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF
[for the text that appears here, see Appendix B.I.]
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CLEAR MNEMONIC OUTLINE OF QUINLAN ORDER FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF
[For the text that appears here, see Appendix B.2.j
CLEAR NORMALIZED FORM OF QUINLAN ORDER FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF
[For the text that appears here, see Appendix B.3.j
PRESENT VERSION OF THE QUINLAN ORDER FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF
In In re Quinlan, the New Jersey Supreme Court issued the order for declaratory relief
that follows. Spacing is introduced to make the parts and the relationships between them
more apparent.
we herewith declare the following affirmative relief on behalf of the plaintiff.
Upon the concurrence of the guardian and family of Karen, should the responsible
attending physicians conclude
that there is no reasonable possibility of Karen's ever emerging from her
present comatose condition to a cognitive, sapient state and
that the life-support apparatus now being administered to Karen should be
discontinued,
they shall consult with the hospital "Ethics Committee" or like body of the
institution in which Karen is then hospitalized.
If
that consultative body agrees that there is no reasonable possibility of Karen's
ever emerging from her present comatose condition to a cognitive, sapient state,
that the present life-support system may be withdrawn and
said action shall be without any civil or criminal liability therefor on the part of
any participant, whether guardian, physician, hospital or others.(Footnote 10)We
herewith specifically so hold.
Footnote 10. The declaratory relief we here award is not intended to imply
that the principles enunciated in this case might not be applicable in divers
other types of terminal medical situations such as those described by Drs.
Korein and Diamond, Supra, not necessarily involving the hopeless loss of
cognitive or sapient life.

IN THE MATTER OF W R E N QUINLAN, AN ALLEGED INCOMPETENT
[The text of the entire opinion of the New Jersey Supreme Court in In re Quinlan,
70 N.J. 10 (1976) would appear here.]

If you are finished, then press the <Esc> key to end the session with this file. Then you can
1) access the QUINLAN LES, by entering at the system prompt:
QUINLAN
or
2) return to the NJ2C-11 LES, by entering at the system prompt:
NJ2C-11
or
3 ) otherwise continue your research before returning to NJZC-11;
When the user enters "QUINLAN" to access the QUINLAN LES, the following appears
on the screen:
[For an account of a sample run of the QUINLAN LES, see Appendix 8.5.1
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In the session with the QUINLAN LES the user is advised that in the situation being
analyzed, removal of the respirator will not be the legal cause of the death of the patient,
if that occurs. After finishing the session, when the user re-enters the NJ2C-11 LES by
entering at the system prompt:
NJ2C-11
the NJ2C-11 LES continues it5 questioning. An account of the remainder of that session
follows.
person-causes?
In the situation that you are analyzing is it the case that
a person purposely, knowingly, recklessly, or, by driving a
vehicle recklessly, causes the death of another human being? N
Select
Yes
No
Unknown
Help
Definition
Pause
stop
aids-suicide
In the situation that you are analyzing is it the case that
a person purposely aids another to commit suicide? N
Select
Yes
NO
Unknown
Help
Definition
Pause
stop
INFERRED RESULT
NOT crimnUomicide
IT IS NOT SO THAT
the person is guilty of criminal homicide
Based on the Interpretation of Professor Layman E. Allen of this provision and your
responses given below to the questions asked:
QUESTIONS
person-causes
1
aids-suicide ?

RESPONSES
N
N

the following results can be inferred for the reasons given:
THE RESULT NOT crimnl-homicide
CAN BE INFERRED FOR THE FOLLOWING REASON(S):
NOT person-causes.
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THE RESULT IT IS NOT SO THAT
the person is guilty of criminal homicide
CAN BE INFERRED FOR THE FOLLOWING REASON(S):
IT IS NOT SO THAT
a person purposely, knowingly, recklessly, or by driving a vehicle recklessly, causes
the death of another human being.
On the basis of the same interpretation and the same responses none of the following
results can be inferred:
RESULT(S) THAT CANNOT BE INFERRED
crimnlLhomicide
manslaughter
m-seconhdegree
isxurder
affirmity-defense
agg-manslaughter
adirst-degree
deatkby-auto
dba-. f o u r t h d g r e e
courtxay-order
guilty2-degree
guilty-4-degree
(for L. E. Allen and S. Payton)
University of Michigan
Ann Arbor
Mi 48109-1215
USA
(for Ch. S. Saxon)
Eastern Michigan University
Ypsilan ti
Mi 481 97

USA
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